A Contest With Complimentarity

*Matt Wiser
Department of Economics - Louisiana State University

Sudipta Sarangi
Department of Economics - Louisiana State University

Dan Kovenock
Department of Economics - University of Iowa

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     Last modified: November 30, 2010
     Presentation date: 03/13/2011 10:15 AM in NH 1120, Session A
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Abstract
In this paper, we examine a game when two competing sides expend effort to win control of areas. Each side is attempting to build a path of connected areas between two given sides of the competition region, in order to obtain a fixed prize. We show that the ordering and combinations of simultaneous competitions does impact the expected value to the competitors, however for the cases studied, this variation is relatively small. We then extend the competition to include decision making by the original owners of the areas.

Appendices
      Mathematical Appendix