Group Contest with Internal Conflict and Power Inequality

*Jaesoo Kim
IUPUI, Economics

Subhasish Chowdhury
University of East Anglia

Jay Pil Choi
Michigan State University

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     Last modified: December 10, 2010
     Presentation date: 03/13/2011 12:00 PM in NH 1130, Session B
     (View Schedule)

Abstract
This article studies the interaction between simultaneous inter-group and intra-group conflicts. We introduce power inequality between group members and consider a constant elasticity of substitution group impact function. We explain how each group's internal conflict influences its chance of winning in the external conflict and show that a less conflictive group may expend more effort in collective action if the group impact function shows enough degrees of complementarity. In addition, we show a possible non-monotonic change of the equilibrium payoff and rent dissipation with respect to the power inequality.