The Equilibrium Order of Games in Best-of-Three Contests

*Alex Krumer
Department of Economics at Ben Gurion University

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     Last modified: March 8, 2011
     Presentation date: 03/13/2011 12:00 PM in NH 1120, Session A
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Abstract
We study a best-of-three all-pay contest with two teams in which the first team to win two games wins the contest. Each team has a value of winning the contest as well as a value of winning a single game. It is assumed that a team's value of winning a game in its home field is higher than its value of winning a game away from home. The stronger team (the team with the higher value of winning the contest) plays twice at its home field and once away from it. We analyze the equilibrium order of games according to which no one has an incentive to switch to a different order of games, since switching would not yield a higher expected payoff.