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	*Patrick Andreoli Versbach, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition Frank Müller-Langer, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition The Absence of “Order-Effects” in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-life Randomized Experiment

	*Eva-Maria Aulich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Skilled or Just Overconfident? Field Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Overconfidence on Promotion Probability

	*Tim Barmby, Economics, University of Aberdeen Ben Kriechel, ROA Maastricht University First or Last: An Economic Model of Contest Judging and Early Performance Bias

	*Jennifer Brown, Northwestern University Jin Li, Northwestern University Going for It: The Adoption of Risky Strategies in Tournaments

	Jennifer Brown, Northwestern University *Dylan Minor, UC-Berkeley Effort Shadows and Spillovers in Elimination Tournaments

	*Pablo Casas-Arce, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Busine Asís Martínez-Jerez, Harvard Business School, Accounting Department The All-pay Auction with Handicaps

	*Evangelia Chalioti, Athens University of Economics and Business Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers

	Luis Corchon, Economics, University Carlos III *Carmen Bevia A THEORY OF PROTRACTED WARS

	Christopher Cotton, Economics, University of Miami Competing for the Attention of Decision Makers

	*Josse Delfgaauw, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute Robert Dur, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CESifo, and IZA Arjan Non, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute Willem Verbeke, Erasmus University Rotterdam and ERIM Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay: A Field Experiment

	*Douglas Frank, INSEAD Tomasz Obloj, INSEAD Reference Points and Organizational Performance: Evidence from Retail Banking

	*Qiang Fu, Department of Business Policy, National University of Singap Qian Jiao , Department of Economics, National University of Singapore Jingfeng Lu, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore On Contests with Costly and Stochastic Entry

	Thomas Giebe, Humboldt University at Berlin, Germany, Economic Theory I *Paul Schweinzer, University of York, UK, Economics The efficient provision of public goods through non-distortionary tax contests

	*Scott Gilpatric, University of Tennessee Economics Christian Vossler, University of Tennessee Economics Lirong Liu, Sam Houston State University Regulatory Enforcement with Dynamic Mechanisms Including a Targeting Tournament

	*Russell Golman, Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University Sudeep Bhatia, Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University Performance Evaluation Inflation

	*Samuel Haefner, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel Clausewitz on Auctions

	*Andrea Hammermann, International Human Resource Management, RWTH Aachen Univers Alwine Mohnen, International Human Resource Management, RWTH Aachen University Group Size and Trophy Value of Symbolic Rewards: Their Impacts on Effort-Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment-

	*Bob Hammond, Economics, North Carolina State University Xiaoyong Zheng, Agricultural and Resource Economics, North Carolina State University Heterogeneity in Tournaments: An Experimental Analysis

	*Wolfgang Hoechtl, Dept. of Economics/University of Innsbruck Rudi Kerschbamer, Dept. of Economics/University of Innsbruck/Austria Rudi Stracke, University of St. Gallen/Switzerland Uwe Sunde, University of St. Gallen/Switzerland One-shot Contest vs. Sequential Elimination Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents - Effort Provision, Sorting and the Discouragement Effect

	*Brad Humphreys, University of Alberta, Department of Economics Bernd Frick, University of Paderborn, Department of Management Prize Structure and Performance: Evidence from NASCAR

	*Todd Kaplan, Economics, University of Haifa David Wettstein, Economics, Ben-Gurion University The Optimal Design of Rewards in Contests

	*Jaesoo Kim, IUPUI, Economics Subhasish Chowdhury, University of East Anglia Jay Pil Choi, Michigan State University Group Contest with Internal Conflict and Power Inequality

	*Rene Kirkegaard, Department of Economics, University of Guelph Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests

	*Bettina Klose, ISU, University of Zurich Roman Sheremeta, Department of Economics, Chapman University Behavior in All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions with Identity-Dependent Externalities

	Bettina Klose, ISU, University of Zurich *Dan Kovenock, University of Iowa Extremism Drives Out Moderation

	*Martin Kolmar, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen Hendrik Rommeswinkel, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen Group Contests with CES-Impact Functions

	*Alex Krumer, Department of Economics at Ben Gurion University The Equilibrium Order of Games in Best-of-Three Contests

	Illoong Kwon, Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National Uni Tournament for Belief and Optimal Uncertainty

	Frederic Loss, CNAM and Imperial College London *Antoine Renucci, Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour and Universite Paris-Dauphine When Promotions induce Good Managers to be Lazy

	Pia Luenstroth, University of Trier, Germany Searching for the Best? Clubs and their admission decisions

	Alexander Matros, Economics University of South Carolina All-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Fundraising Mechanisms: Theory and Evidence

	Todd McFall, Department of Economics, Wake Forest University Julianne Treme, Department of Economics, University of North Carolina Wilmington How Is Relative Performance Affected by Technological Change?

	*Jeanine Miklos-Thal, University of Rochester, Simon School Hannes Ullrich, University of Zurich Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests

	*Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, Economics, University of East Anglia Dongryul Lee, School of Technology Management, UNIST (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology Roman Sheremeta, Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University Top Guns May Not Fire: Group Contests with Public-Good Prize and Best-shot Impact Function

	*Michael Neugart, School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bozen Matteo Richiardi, Department of Economics, University of Turin Sequential Teamwork in Competitive Environments: Theory and Evidence from Swimming Data

	*Petra Nieken, University of Bonn Matthias Kräkel, University of Bonn Corporate Careers in the Shadow of Bankruptcy

	*Tuvana Pastine, Dept. of Economics, National University of Ireland Maynooth Ivan Pastine, School of Economics, UCD Political Campaign Spending Limits

	*Ivan Pastine, School of Economics, University College Dublin Tuvana Pastine, Dept. of Economics, National University of Ireland Maynnoth All-Pay Contests with Constraints

	*Paul Pecorino, Department of Economics, University of Alabama Amy Farmer, Department of Economics, University of Arkansas Title IX and the Allocation of Resources to Women’s and Men’s Sports

	Thomas Peeters, University of Antwerp The shape of success: estimating contest success functions in sports

	Brennan Platt, Economics, Brigham Young University Auctions for Priority Access

	*Leonid Polishchuk, Higher School of Economics, Moscow Alexander Tonis , New Economic School, Moscow Endogenous Contest Success Functions: A Mechanism Design Approach

	*Robert Ridlon, Sungkyunkwan University Graduate School of Business Rick Harbaugh, Business Economics, Indiana University Kelley School of Business Handicapping Under Uncertainty in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions

	*Brian Roberson, Purdue University, Department of Economics Dan Kovenock, Univeristy of Iowa Roman Sheremeta, Chapman University The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

	*Dmitry Ryvkin, Department of Economics, Florida State University Philip Brookins, Department of Economics, Florida State University An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information

	*Marco Sahm, Departement of Business and Economics, TU Munich The Contest Winner: Gifted or Venturesome?

	*Lambert Schoonbeek, Department of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Universit Rob J. Everhardt, Department of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, University of Groningen Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information

	*Paul Schweinzer, Economics, University of York Beatrice Roussillon, Economics, University of Manchester Efficient Emissions Reduction

	*Paul Schweinzer, Economics, University of York Ella Segev, Ben Gurion Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, University of the Negev The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

	Aner Sela, Economics Department, Ben-Gurion University Dynamic Contests with Resource Constraints

	Stergios Skaperdas, University of California-Irvine Contests for Power

	Raymond Stefani, Californa State University, Long Beach A Comparitive Survey of Officially Recognized International Sports Rating Systems

	Rudi Stracke, SEW, University of St.Gallen Multi-Stage Pairwise Elimination Contests

	*Uwe Sunde, Economics Department, University of St.Gallen Rudi Stracke, Economics Department, University of St.Gallen Rudi Kerschbamer, University of Innsbruck Wolfgang Hoechtl, University of Innsbruck Optimal Design of Multi-Stage Elimination Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence

	Stefan Szymanski, Cass Business School, City University London Sports Competition Around a Circle

	Michael Waldman, The Johnson School, Cornell University Classic Labor Market Tournaments versus Market-Based Tournaments

	*Matt Wiser, Department of Economics - Louisiana State University Sudipta Sarangi, Department of Economics - Louisiana State University Dan Kovenock, Department of Economics - University of Iowa A Contest With Complimentarity

	*Andrew Yates, University of Richmond Roman Sheremeta, Chapman University Shakun Mago, University of Richmond Best of three contests: experimental evidence

	Anil Yildizparlak, Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Transfers and Alliance Break Up

	Young-Ro Yoon, Department of Economics, Wayne State University Strategic Disclosure of Meaningful Information within the Environment with Competing Agents

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